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JURY TRIAL IN CHANCERY COURT IN TENNESSEE
Tennessee has since 18271 maintained, in some degree, a separate
court of equity, presided over by a chancellor. Though most states
have abolished the procedural distinction between cases in law and
suits in equity, Tennessee still retains this dichotomy in its court
system. Prior to 1827 law and equity were dispensed in Tennessee by
a single court of general jurisdiction, the Superior Court of Law. This
practice grew out of the North Carolina Act of 17822 and the con-
tinuation of that Act by the First Territorial Legislature in 1794,3
both of which gave equity jurisdiction to the Superior Court of Law.
All matters of fact in law or in equity in this court were triable by a
jury as if at law.4 This was the practice when the Tennessee Consti-
tution of 17965 was adopted. The Act of 18096 abolished the Superior
Court and established the Circuit Court in its stead with all its juris-
diction in law and equity. Such unity was short-lived for the Act
of 1819T provided that all chancery cases should be taken on deposi-
tion; the Circuit Court sitting in an equity cause was styled the Court
of Chancery. Finally the Act of 18278 created two separate chancery
courts and appointed a chancellor for each.
Although prior to the Constitution of 17969 the statutory right to
jury trial in equity was the same as at law, the courts limited the
constitutional right of jury trial to those cases in which it existed as
a common-law right in the North Carolina territory.10 Of course,
1. Tenn. Acts 1827, c. 79, § 2, 1 LAWS OF TENNESSEE 175 (Haywood and
Cobbs 1831) created separate Courts of Chancery.
2. N.C. Acts 1782, c. 11, § 2, LAWS OF TENNESSEE 153 (Haywood 1815).
3. This Act of 1794, c. 1, § 77, 1 LAWS OF TENNESSEE AND NORTH CAROLINA
484 (Scott 1821), declared the North Carolina Act of 1782, which gave equity
jurisdiction to the Superior Courts of Law, to be in full force and effect.
4. "All matters of fact . . . shall be determined by a jury ... as in trials
at law.., and mode of procedure by such juries shall be the same in every
respect as in trials at law .... " N.C. Acts 1782, c. 11, § 3, LAWS OF TENNESSEE
156 (Haywood 1815) (re-enacted in Tennessee as shown in note 3 supra).
5. TENN. CONST. Art. V, §§ 1, 2 (1796).
6. Tenn. Acts 1809, c. 49, § 4, 1 LAWS OF TENNESSEE AND NORTH CAROLINA
1148 (Scott 1821).
7. Tenn. Acts 1819, c. 31, § 1, 2 LAWS OF TENNESSEE AND NORTH CAROLINA
485 (Scott 1821).
8. See note 1 supra.
9. The Statutory right to jury trial on all issues of fact in equity, as at
law, was first granted while Tennessee was a part of North Carolina in 1782
(see note 4 supra) and re-enacted while Tennessee was still a territory in
1794 (see note 3 supra); both grants precede TENN. CONST. Art. XI, § 6 (1796),
by which the right to jury trial was preserved inviolate.
10. The earlier cases preserved the right to trial by jury as it existed in
"force and use" in North Carolina in the year 1789. See Garner v. The State,
13. Tenn. 132, 146 (1833). However, the later decisions limit this inviolate
right to cases in which there was at common law a right to jury trial at the
formation of the constitution of 1796. See Trigally v. The Mayor and Alder-
men of Memphis, 46 Tenn. 382, 385 (1869); Exum v. Griffis Newbern Co.,
144 Tenn. 239, 247, 230 S.W. 601 (1921); Willard v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 645,
130 S.W.2d 99 (1938); McGinnis v. The State, 28 Tenn. 23, 28 (1848).
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in accord with the English practice the chancellor could at his dis-
cretion1 ' call a jury or transfer to a law court12 a disputed, material
issue of fact so that a jury could inform "the conscience of the
Chancellor,!' 13 but this jury verdict was merely advisory. 14 The'
legislature in 1846, however, placed a duty upon the chancellor "upon
the application of either of the parties, to empannel [sic] a jury to try
... any case pending in said courts-the finding of which jury shall
be final and conclusive upon the chancellor. . ". .",5 This was one of
the first of a line of statutes which create the right to jury trial in
chancery court. It should be noted that no qualifying limitations were
placed on this right; rather the jury could be demanded by "either"
party to try "any" issue of fact in "any" case in chancery court,
Though" the previous practice was to seek only a special verdict on
a specified fact issue 6 the right to both general and special jury
verdicts was granted under this statute. 7 Since there were no com-
mon-law actions triable in chancery at this time, the legislature
clearly intended to extend the right of jury trial to a purely equitable
cause.
The chancery court was made a constitutional court in 187018 and
in 1877 its jurisdiction was expanded to include "all civil causes of
action now triable in the Circuit Court, except ... [those] involving
11. See Simmons v. Tillery and Wilson, 1 Tenn. 217, 222-23 (1808); Lowe
v. Traynor, 46 Tenn. 633, 637 (1869); State v. Allen, 2 Tenn. Ch. Rep. 42, 46
(1874) '(discretion to send fact issue to court of law or to impanel a jury in
chancery); Lawson v. Cooper, 263 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S. 1953).
The chancellor may upon his motion and for his advice convene a jury at
any time in the trial. GIBsow, Surrs IN CHANCERY § 554a (4th ed., Higgins
and Crownover, 1937). But when the impaneling of a jury is properly sought
by the parties the matter is no longer discretionary with the chancellor.
Allen v. Saulpaw, 74 Tenn. 477 (1880); Cooper & Stockell v. Stockard, 84 Tenn.
140 (1885). Compare Miller v. Washington County, 143 Tenn. 488, 500, 226
S.W. 199 (1920) (decided under Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 90), with Greenwood v.
Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 612, 231 S.W.2d 315 (1950) (the latest supreme court
decision on this subject).
12. Tenn. Acts 1801, c. 6, § 40, 1 LAWS OF TENNESSEE 182 (Haywood and
Cobbs 1831) (granted chancellor power to call jury instanter); Orgain v.
Ramsey, 22 Tenn. 438 (1842); Timmons v. Garrison, 23 Tenn. 108, 110 (1843).
13. James v. Brooks, 53 Tenn. 150 (1871).
14. Timmons v. Garrison, 23 Tenn. 108, 110 (1843); Orgain v. Ramsey, 22
Tenn. 438 (1842); Lawson v. Cooper, 263 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tenn. Ct. App.
E.S. 1953).
15. Tenn. Acts 1846, c. 122, § 14.
16. See, e.g., Simmons v. Tillery and Wilson, 1 Tenn. 217 (1808) (issues
as determined by chancellor); Lancaster's Administrators v. Ward andBosly,
1 Tenn. 340 (1809); Baker v. King, 14Tenn. 215 (1834).
17. See, e.g., Allen v. Saulpaw, 74 Tenn. 477 (1880) (error for failure to
allow jury verdict on special issues); Nelson v. Claybrooke, 72 Tenn. 687,
688-89 (1880) (special verdict); Mills v. Faris & Co., 59 Tenn. 451, 453-54
(1873) -(special verdict); Morris v. Swaney, 54 Tenn. 591, 592-93 (1872) (gen-
eral verdict); James v. Brooks, 53 Tenn. 150, 152-53 (1871) (general verdict"not guilty"); Lowe v. Traynor, 46 Tenn. 633, 635-36 (1869) (special verdict).
18. TEm. CONST. Art. VI, § 1 (1870).
NOTES
unliquidated damages .... "19 This extension of chancery jurisdiction
was a re-enactment of the Act of 178220 and the Constitution of North
Carolina2' to the extent that it gave a court of primary jurisdiction
the power, to hear cases in law and suits in equity. Therefore, again,
there was an unlimited right to a jury trial in any cause, legal or
equitable, over which chancery had jurisdiction. Except for tem-
porary variations, 22 this statute remained unchanged until 1932 when
the Code Commissioners,23 with the approval of the Joint Committee
on Codification,24 modified the right to jury trial in chancery in the
following manner:
"Either party to suit in chancery is entitled, upon application, to a jury
to try and determine any material fact'in dispute, save in cases involving
complicated accounting, as to such accounting, and those elsewhere ex-
cepted by law or by provision of this Code, and all the issues of fact in
any proper case shall be submitted to one jury."
25
Under the courts' limited interpertation of the constitutional right28
to jury trial, this statute is the only source of such a right in
chancery.2 7 What is the proper interpretation of this statute?
PROPER CASES FOR JURY
Either party28 presenting a material question of fact and making
a timely request has a statutory right to a jury trial in a "proper
case." All civil suits for liquidated damages are "proper" cases for
jury trial in chancery if the material, disputed fact issues for which
a jury is sought, involve neither complicated accounting nor are else-
19. Tenn. Acts 1877, c. 97, §§ 1, 2.
20. See note 2 supra.
21. N.C. CONST., §§ 13, 21, 29 (1776) provided the constitutional authority
for the Act of 1782 which created one court of law and equity. GIBSON, SuITs
i CHANCERY § 10, (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover, 1937).
22. The right to have a jury impaneled in chancery court was repealed by
Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 90, §§ 1, 2. This right was reinstated, however, by Tenn.
Acts 1921, c. 10, § 1.
23. The restrictions on the right to jury trial in chancery were written into
the TENN. CODE ANN. § 10574 (Williams 1934) by the Code Commissioners in
their draft of the Code submitted to the Joint Committee on Codification of
the Sixty-seventh General Assembly. Note the Preface to the TENNESSEE
CODE of 1932.
24. This committee, composed of the members of the judiciary committees
of the Senate and the House, met with the Commissioners, and revised the
original dummy draft. A study of this "dummy" draft, kept in the State
Archives, shows that the procedure for the revision of the Commissioner's
draft was by red pencil deletion and insertion of the Joint Committee's
changes. This study also reveals that Code Section 10574 was enacted as
the Commissioners proposed it in their original draft.
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10574 (Williams 1934).
26. See note 10 supra.
27. See Third Nat. Bank v. American Equitable Ins., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 257,
178 S.W.2d 915, 919 (1943).
28. All parties complainant or all parties defendant must join in the re-




where excepted by law or provisions of the Code. Hence there is a
statutory right to jury trial in the vast majority of chancery suits.
There are certain criteria by which the complainant can determine
whether he has a "proper case" for a jury trial.2 If the cause could
have been brought in the circuit court and a jury trial had, then there
is also a right to a jury in chancery, unless the case is excepted by
law or Code provision. If the cause is brought in chancery under its
inherent equity jurisdiction, and the pleadings disclose that there are
material, disputed issues of fact, a jury should be impaneled upon
request unless those issues involve complicated accounting, or are
excepted by law.
If the case involves an issue triable by jury at common-law and
prays only legal relief the respondent should have a constitutional
right to jury trial, even under the supreme court's limited interpre-
tation.30 The complainant had a choice of bringing his civil cause of
action for liquidated damages either in circuit court where the right
of jury trial is constitutional and absolute or in chancery where that
right is only statutory and limited. Hence the complainant has not
been denied the right to jury trial but has waived that right. This
cannot be said as to the respondent for he could answer only in the
court in which he was sued.
The Tennessee Legislature impliedly recognized this problem in
the Act of 191931 and preserved this constitutional right of the re-
spondent to a jury trial in the common-law action while repealing
those sections of the Code of 185832 which gave an unqualified right
to jury trial in chancery. The Act stated that the complainant who
sued under the provisions of the Act of 1877, which gave chancery
jurisdiction over common-law actions for liquidated damages, shall
"have waived the right to demand a trial by jury by not having elected
to sue at law .... ,,3 But where the defendant in such a case demands
a jury in his first pleading "the Chancellor, by an order . . . shall
transfer the cause to the Circuit Court . . . where it shall be tried
before the court and a jury."34 This was repealed by the Act of
1921, 35 and those sections of the Code of 1858 which were in effect
before the Act of 1919 were re-enacted. With this exception, the
Code of 1858 and its subsequent re-codifications up until 1932 pro-
vided for the unqualified right of jury trial on material issues of
29. There are some cases in which a jury is considered especially appro-
priate. See GmsoN, SUrrs 3N CHAxcERY § 458f (4th ed., Higgins and Crown-
over, 1937).
30. See note 10 supra.
31. Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 90, §§ 1-3.
32. TmN. CODE §§ 4465-4470 (Meigs and Cooper 1858).
33. Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 90, § 2.
34. Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 90, §§ 2-3.
35. Tenn. Acts 1921, c. 10, § 1.
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fact upon the timely request of either party. Such legislation pre-
served inviolate not only the constitutional right of jury trial36 but
also the statutory right as it existed at the adoption of the constitu-
tion of 1796.37 The Code of 1932 placed some restrictions on the right
of jury trial in chancery but surely did not intend by implication to
deprive the respondent of his constitutional right to trial by jury
as it existed at common law. Though there are no decisions in point,
it seems logical to conclude that Code Section 10574 recognizes the
constitutional right of the respondent to a jury trial on any materially
disputed question of fact arising out of a case in which such a right
existed at common law.
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The right to jury trial involves two distinct ideas; the right deter-
mined at the outset of the case to have a jury impaneled, and subse-
quently upon the presentation of the required quantum of evidence
the right to a jury verdict.38 Upon the resolution that the case is
"proper" for a jury trial the statute intelligibly governs the method of
procedure and the effect of jury trial.
Right to have Jury Impaneled:
If one of the parties fails, to make a timely demand he waives the
right to have a jury impaneled as he would at law. Since the statutes 9
which regulate when and how a demand for jury in law shall be
made do not apply to chancery,40 any demand is timely which is made
before the cause is heard by the chancellor.41 However, each chan-
cellor has the inherent power to make reasonable rules of procedure
for demanding a jury.42 The prevention of surprise and the affording
36. TENN. CoNsT. Art. )9, § 6 (1776).
37. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
38. Confusing the two aspects of jury trial has resulted in conflicting
decisions. In Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666 (1935), the plead-
ings had established the right to a jury which was impaneled and the
issue was whether evidence was introduced sufficient to create the right to
a jury verdice. But Doughty v. Grills, 260 S.W.2d 379, 386-87 (Tenn. Ct. App.
E.S. 1952) interprets the Hunt decision as holding that in an inherently equi-
table cause there is no right to a jury trial (either to impanel a jury or to
a jury verdict).
39. TENx. CODE ANN. §§ 8734-39 (Williams 1934).
40. See Worthington v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 114 Tenn. 177, 182, 86
S.W. 307 (1904); Cheatham v. Pearce & Ryan, 89 Tenn. 668, 689-91, 15 S.W.
1080 (1891); Stepp v. Stepp, 11 Tenn. App. 578, 581 (W.S. 1930).
41 See Cheatham v. Pearce & Ryan, 89 Tenn. 668, 688, 15 S.W. 1080 (1891)
(collects cases); Stepp v. Stepp, 11 Tenn. App. 578, 581 (1930) (collects cases).
42. See Cheatham v. Pearce & Ryan, 89 Tenn. 668, 691, 15 S.W. 1080 (1891)
(collects cases); Stepp v. Stepp, 11 Tenn. App. 578, 583 (1930). A rule re-
quiring the demand for jury on or before the second day of the term was
held to be reasonable. Stadler & Co. v. Hertz & Co., 81 Tenn. 315 (1884). But
a rule requiring that the motion be made in open court was held to be
unreasonable where the respondent sought a jury in his answer. World
Granite Co. v. Morris Bros., 142 Tenn. 665, 222 S.W. 527 (1919).
1954]
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of an opportunity to demand a jury are the measure of the reason-
ableness of these procedural rules.43 Where the demand is made in
the pleadings, the cause will be tried at the first term after issue is
joined.44 But if the demand is made after the cause is ready for hear-
ing, the trial will be before a jury summoned instanter,45 and the
chancellor may set the date.46
The statute requires that chancery follow the procedure of the law
courts.47 This has introduced many significant changes in chancery
practice: the use of oral testimony,48 the summons of witnesses and
the enforcement of their attendance,49 the necessity of a motion for
new trial as a prerequisite of appeal, 0 and the appellate review of
only questions of law rather than traditional simple appeal which is
a de novo trial.5 ' But in certain other respects chancery courts have
found the traditional equity procedure preferable.52
Right to Jury Verdict:
When the pleadings present an issue of fact in a "proper case" the
parties have a right to have a jury impaneled but neither party has a
right to a jury verdict unless evidence sufficient to satisfy the required
quantum has been introduced. Hence the party who seeks a jury in
chancery must submit at his peril enough evidence to keep the chan-
cellor from withholding the issues from the jury.53  It has been
43. Harris v. Bogle, 115 Tenn. 701, 710, 92 S.W. 849 (1905).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10576 (Williams 1934).
45. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10575 (Williams 1934).
46. GiBsoN, SUITs IN CHANCERY § 548 (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover,
1937).
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10579 (Williams 1934).
48. See Greenwood v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 603, 231 S.W.2d 315, 317,
(1950); Ray v. Crain, 18 Tenn. App. 603, 609, 80 S.W.2d 113, 117 (M.S. 1934)
(oral testimony of twenty-six witnesses); Bejack, The Chancery Court, 20
TENN. L. REV. 245, 251 (1948).
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10580 (Williams 1934).
50. Davis v. Mitchell, 27 Tenn. App. 182, 204, 178 S.W.2d 889, 898 (W.S.
1943); GIBSON, SUITS IN CHANCERY § 551c (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover,
1937).
51. TENN. CODE ANtN. § 9037 (Williams 1934) (excepts jury verdict in chan-
cery from the right to de novo appeal); see Collier v. City of Memphis, 160
Tenn. 500, 26 S.W.2d 152 (1929); GIBsoN, SuITs IN CHANCERY § 551g (4th ed.,
Higgins and Crownover, 1937).
52. The reading of the pleadings is a matter within the discretion of the
chancellor. GmsoN, SUITS IN CHANCERY § 551a (4th ed., Higgins and Crown-
over, 1937). Where a special quantum of evidence is required it is the duty
of the chancellor, rather than of the jury, to determine whether the evidence
meets this rquirement. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 11, 80 S.W.2d 666, 669
(1935). The chancellor has a much broader latitude in withdrawing issues
from the jury than the circuit judge in directing a verdict. Hunt v. Hunt,
supra, at 10. There are no directed verdicts in chancery. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of New York v. Burton, 167 Tenn. 606, 613, 72 S.W.2d 778, 780 (1934)
(collects cases). Directing a verdict has the effect of withdrawing the issue
so that the verdict is nugatory. Standard Life Ins. Co. of the South v. Strong,
19 Tenn. App. 404, 409, 89 S.W.2d 367, 371 (M.S. 1935). But see Anderson v.
Stribling, 15 Tenn. App. 267, 276-77 (M.S. 1932); see note 51 infra.
53. See Greenwood v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 606, 607, 231 S.W.2d 315
(1950); Burton v. Farmers', Etc. Ass'n, 104 Tenn. 414, 417, 58 S.W. 230, 231
[VOL. 7
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frequently held that the chancellor retains a much broader latitude
in withdrawing issues from the jury than does a circuit judge in
directing a verdict.5 4 How does this fit into the statutory requirement
that the jury trial should be the same as at law? Is the required
quantum of evidence necessary to establish a jury issue different in
these chancery proceedings? Of course this requirement is applicable
only to the common-law actions over which these two courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. Where the suit arises under the inherent
equity jurisdiction of chancery the courts have held that the chan-
cellor, under the statute, could properly require the same quantum
of evidence as was required traditionally in equity55 before an issue
is presented to a jury for its verdict.5 6 When evidence sufficient, if
believed, to satisfy this special quantum is presented, a jury issue is
established even though the evidence is thoroughly contradicted.57
The parties may, separately or by agreement,5s present .the fact
issues upon which they want a jury verdict. The preparation of those
issues is under the supervision of the chancellor, who has the power
and the duty to mold the submitted issues so as to present only the
determinative issues of fact.5 9. The method and time for presenting
such issues is subject to the reasonable discretion of the chancellor.60
The form of the issues and the scope of the jury's verdict is a more
complex problem. Traditionally a jury in equity was called only by
the chancellor for his information and aid; the questions submitted
did not purport to encompass the case but rather covered particular
issues of fact concerning which the chancellor had serious doubt.61
Usually such questions were to be answered categorically; the chan-
(1900); Ragsdale and Mabry v. Gossett, 70 Tenn. 729, 740 (1879). The chan-
cellor has a duty to withdraw the issues from the jury if they are immaterial.
See De Rossett Hat Co. v. London Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 134 Tenn. 199,
207, 183 S.W. 720, 722 (1915) (collects cases).
54. See Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 618, 184 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1943); Hunt v.
Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 10, 80 S.W.2d 666, 669 (1935) (in cases of an equitable
nature). However, withdrawing an issue because there is no material evi-
dence to support it is a question of law reviewable upon appeal. See Lincoln
County Bank v. Maddox, 21 Tenn. App. 648, 660, 114 S.W.2d 821, 828 (M.S.
1937); Ray v. Crain, 18 Tenn. App. 603, 609, 80 S.W.2d 113, 117 (M.S. 1934)
(common-law action); Anderson v. Stribling, 15 Tenn. App. 267, 277 (M.S.
1932).
55. See Greenwood v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 612, 231 S.W.2d 315, 320 (1950).
56. See Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666 (1935).
57. See Greenwood v. Maxey, supra note 55, at 612-13.
58. This has always been the chancery practice. See Lancaster's Adminis-
trators v. Ward and Bosly, 1 Tenn. 340, 342 (1809). See also Gmsow, SuiTs IN
CHANcERY § 549c (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover, 1937).
59. See De Rossett Hat Co. v. London Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 134 Tenn.
199, 207, 183 S.W. 720 (1915); Burton v. Farmers', Etc. Ass'n, 104 Tenn. 414,
417. 58 S.W. 230, 231 (1900).
60. See First Nat. Bank of Coeburn v. Hartsell, 14 Tenn. App. 578, 580 (E.S.
1932); Newburger v. Newburger, 10 Tenn. App. 555, 561 (W.S. 1930); Madison
Land & Loan Co. v. Hammond, 2 Tenn. App. 423, 429-31 (W.S. 1926) (collects
cases).
61. Lancaster's Administrators v. Ward and Bosly, 1 Tenn. 430, 433 (1809).
1954]-
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cellor then decided the suit.2 - The Code clearly authorizes a general
verdict in requiring that the trial is to "be conducted like other jury
trials at law."63 If the "proper case" is to be tried as at law, the usual
practice would be for the chancellor sitting as a judge to present the
case for the jury's general verdict. By statute 4 it is within the judge's
discretion to form special issues for submission to the jury and this
is the recommended practice.65 However, where several determinative
issues of fact are submitted for special verdict, the jury must return
a finding on all or none of the issues and "may not find on one or
more and disagree on another and the verdict be valid."601
As a general rule the verdict of the jury, regardless of its scope
(general or special6 7) has the same binding effect upon the chancellor
and the appellate court68 as it has at law. The Code6 9 expressly pro-
vides that where one of the parties requests a jury in a "proper case"
the verdict is binding. 0 "As at law," the chancellor is under a duty
to grant a new trial if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence;
on appeal the appellate court may grant a new trial. Neither how-
ever, may disregard the verdict as was formerly possible in chancery.
62. State ex rel. Mynatt v. King, 137 Tenn. 17, 26-27, 191 S.W. 352 (1916);
Cooper & Stockell v. Stockard, 84 Tenn. 140, 143-44 (1885); Third Nat. Bank
v. American Equitable Ins. Co. of New York, 27 Tenn. App. 249, 257, 178
S.W.2d 915, 919 (M.S. 1943).
63. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10579 (Williams 1934). See Bejack, The Chancery
Court, 20 TENN. L. REV. 245, 251 (1948). But as to the court's interpretation
of the right to general verdict in chancery see: State ex rel. Mynatt v. King,
137 Tenn. 17, 26-27, 191 S.W. 352 (1916) (no general verdict of guilty or not
guilty); Cooper & Stockell v. Stockard, 84 Tenn. 140, 144 (1885) (no general
verdict allowed). While allowing a special verdict the court in Minton v.
Wilkerson, 133 Tenn. 484, 186-87, 182 S.W. 238, 239 (1915), required finding
on all of the special issues. But see Morris v. Swaney, 54 Tenn. 591, 592-93
(1872) (general verdict); James v. Brooks, 53 Tenn. 150, 152-53 (1870)
(general verdict of "not guilty"). Note that there is a distinction drawn
between a general verdict and a special verdict which is determinative of the
entire case. See Wright v. Jackson Const. Co., 138 Tenn. 145, 149-50, 196 S.W.
488 (1917). Is there any real basis for such a distinction?
64. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10346 (Williams 1934). Although this section
involves circuit court practice, the jury trials in chancery under § 10579 of
the Code are to follow the practice of law courts.
65. See GIBSON, SUITs IN CHANCERY § 550 (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover,
1937); Bejach, The Chancery Court, 20 TENN. L. RaV. 245, 251 (1948).
66. Minton v. Wilkerson, 133 Tenn. 484, 486-87, 182 S.W. 238 (1915); Buch-
anan v. Gower, 7 Civ. App. 306, 309-10 (Tenn. 1916).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10346 (Williams 1934) (provides that special verdicts
"shall have the force of other verdicts at law").
68. Beatty v. Schenck, 127 Tenn. 63, 152 S.W. 1933 (1912) (where chancellor
by agreement of the parties sits as the jury, his findings are given the effect
of a binding verdict); McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319, 332, 59 S.W. 1025, 1028
(1900); Scruggs v. Heiskell, 95 Tenn. 455, 457, 32 S.W. 386 (1895) (collects
cases); Hammond v. Herbert Hood Co., 31 Tenn. App. 683, 691, 221 S.W.2d
98, 101 (W.S. 1948) (law case); Davis v. Mitchell, 27 Tenn. App. 182, 196,
178 S.W.2d 889, 895 (W.S. 1943) (equity suit); National Life & Ace. Ins. Co.
v. American Trust Co., 17 Tenn. App. 516, 528, 68 S.W.2d 971, 978 (M.S. 1933);
Johnson v. Graves, 15 Tenn. App. 466, 475 (W.S. 1932).
69. TEN. CODE ANN. § 10579 (Williams 1934).
70. James v. Brooks, 53 Tenn. 150, 154 (1870). See note 68 supra. In each
one of the cases there cited the parties had sought the jury.
[VOL. 7
NOTES
The exception to this general rule exists where the chancellor, inde-
pendently of the parties, seeks the jury; the verdict is then only ad-
visory and not binding on the appellate court.71 Even in this latter
situation the appellate court will not completely disregard the jury
verdict.72
THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTORY ExCEPTIONs
From 1846 up until 1932, with the exception of a three-year period,13
the right to jury trial was made available to either party to a suit in
chancery without further limitation. The Tennessee Code of 1932
limited the previous statutory right to jury trial in chancery by the
following language:
"Save in cases involving complicated accounting, as to such accounting,
and those elsewhere excepted by law or by provision of this Code .... -74
How have the courts determined the scope of each of these exceptions?
To what can we look to determine the legislative purpose in the enact-
ment of these limitations on the right to jury trial in chancery?
The three Code Commissioners,75 who were authorized by the Ten-
nessee General Assembly of 192978 to draw up a new code, suggested
these exceptions in their draft submitted to the Joint Committee on
Codification of the House and Senate in 1931. This Joint Committee,
while making some insignificant changes in portions of Title 10,
Article X-Issues of Fact and Trial by Jury in Chancery-retained
these modifications77 to the right to jury trial in chancery, and the
bill for adoption of the entire Code was passed without amendment
by the General Assembly of 1931.78 Since the dummy draft of the
Code drawn up by the Commissioners with the red pencil work of
the Joint Committee written in its margin is our only source of official
legislative history we must look to the well-known common-law
sense of the statutory language, 9 in light of the original statute, as
the primary guide to the legislative purpose of these limitations.
The clause "save in cases involving complicated accounting, as to
71. Lowe v. Traynor, 46 Tenn. 633 (1869). See Moris v. Swaney, 54 Tenn.
591, 594 (1872) (distinguishes Traynor and Brooks cases).
72. Lowe v. Traynor, 46 Tenn. 633, 638 (1869) (collects cases; sustain un-
less unsupported by proof).
73. See note 22 supra.
74. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10574 (Williams 1934).
75. The three commissioners who were appointed by the supreme court
were: Samuel C. Williams, Chairman; Robert T. Shannon and George Harsh.
76. Tenn. Acts 1929, c. 48.
77. The modification of the TENN. CODE § 4465 (1858) suggested by the
Commissioners and enacted by the legislature in TENN. CODE ANN. § 10574
(Williams 1934) was the insertion of "save in cases involving complicated
accounting, as to such accounting and those elsewhere excepted by law or
by provision of this Code," and consequently changed "all issues of fact in
any caqe" to "any proper case."
78. Tenn. Acts 1931, c. 88.
79. Apple v. Apple, 38 Tenn. 348, 351-52 (1858).
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such accounting," indicates that no jury should be impaneled when
an accounting becomes so complicated that the ordinary juror could
not unravel the jumbled facts and figures of the involved claims and
counterclaims s° Such an account would have come within the in-
herent equity jurisdiction of chancery.8' If the fact issues involved
in a particular case cannot be separated from the complicated account-
ing, the chancellor must deny a jury trial.82 This common-law-sense
interpretation of the statute is verified by the historical development
of the equity action for complicated accounting, in which the very
basis of jurisdiction was the inadequacy of the law action with its
jury trial.
While excepting from the right to jury trial complicated account-
ing, a limited portion of chancery's inherent equity jurisdiction, the
legislature failed to except all other types of inherent equity juris-
diction. If the legislature had intended that all inherently equitable
causes in chancery should be excepted from the right to jury trial
it could have expressly so stated and set up complicated accounting
as as example thereof. But the legislature evidenced an intention to
except only those cases which involved "complicated accounting" and
those only "as to such accounting." It would appear incongruous to
read into this limited exception an intent to except all inherently
equitable causes from this statutory right to jury trial.
The next exception which applies to all those cases "elsewhere
excepted by law or by provision of this Code" 83 is more troublesome
to interpret by the common-law-sense method. Does the meaning of
"elsewhere excepted by law" include all of the common-law and
statutory exceptions to the right of jury trial not found in the Code?
Or is it limited to the statutory exceptions other than those found
in the Code? To hold that "elsewhere excepted by law" means else-
where excepted by the "common law"84 is to exclude all cases of
inherent equity jurisdiction from the right to jury trial. This the
80. In Greene County Union Bank v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 244-45, 75
S.W.2d 49, 52 (1934), the court stated that the basis for inherent equity
jurisdiction was "the inadequacy of the legal remedy, as where there is an
embarrassment in the making of proof, the necessity for a discovery, or the
production of books and papers, or where it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a jury to unravel the numerous transactions involved, and justice
could not be done except by employing the methods of investigation peculiar
to courts of equity." When the chancellor finds that the case falls within this
inherent equity jurisdiction then it would seem to be within the complicated
accounting exception to jury trial.
81. Taylor v. Tompkins, 49 Tenn. 89 (1870).
82. In Greene County Union Bank v. Miller, 18 Tenn. App. 239, 252, 75
S.W.2d 49, 56 (1934), the court split 2-1 on the right to jury trial on the
accounting issues. Judge Faw dissented contending that there were issues
of fact separable from the complicated accounting upon which the party had
a right to jury trial. This case pointedly illustrates the tenuousness of the
right to jury trial in a case of accounting.
83. TENN. CODE AwN. § 10574 (Williams 1934).
84. Doughty v. Grills, 260 S.W.2d 379, 386-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S. 1952).
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legislature implicitly refused to do in the first of these exception
clauses.
Furthermore, to hold that the phrase "elsewhere excepted by law"
includes all the common-law exceptions to the right of jury trial is
virtually to write this statute off the books. The need and purpose
of this section, since it appeared in the Act of 1846, was: first, to grant
the right to jury trial in purely equitable causes; then, with the en-
largement of the chancery jurisdiction in 1877 to include common-law
actions for liquidated damages to guarantee the right to jury trial in
these law actions. This proposed interpretation would limit the right
to jury trial in chancery to its status prior to the statute's enactment.
This interpretation would also amount to the re-enactment by impli-
cation of the Act of 191985 which had abolished the right to jury
trial in chancery. Such an interpretation would be paradoxical since
this Act was repealed in 1921,86 and the unlimited right to jury trial,
which had previously existed for sixty-seven years, was re-established
and remained the law until the Code of 1932. If because of the in-
herent nature of a particular proceeding no right to jury trial had
ever existed at common law, in equity or by express statutory pro-
vision, clearly, no right to jury trial would exist under the present
statute.8 7 But where the statutory right to jury trial has been granted,
the supreme court even in an inherently equitable cause has not lim-
ited that right to its common-law status.
In Hunt v. Hunt,88 the supreme court interpreting this clause as it
applied to an inherently equitable case (establishment of a parol
trust in land) held that though there was a right to a jury trial on
the pleadings the proponent must meet equity's required quantum
of "clear and convincing evidence" in order to establish the statutory
right to a jury verdict.
In Greenwood v. Maxey8 the supreme court interpreting the Hunt
case held that the evidence necessary to establish an inherently equi-
table caise was governed by the same rules as other questions of fact
in other jury cases, except where equity requires a special quantum
of evidence to establish the existence of a parol trust in land. This
quantum must be met before the party has sustained his right to a
jury verdict.
The court of appeals in Doughty v. Grills 9 gave the Hunt case a
different twist, interpreting the decision as meaning that cases of
85. Tenn. Acts 1919, c. 90; see note 22 supra.
86. Tenn. Acts 1921, c. 10, § 1.
87. Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 184 S.W.2d 1 (1944) (jury trial denied on
the basis of the inherent power of the court to summarily punish for con-
tempt).
88. 169 Tenn. 1, 80 S.W.2d 666 (1935).
89. 190 Tenn. 599, 611, 231 S.W.2d 315, 320 (1950).
90. 260 S.W.2d 379, 386-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S. 1952).
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purely equitable cognizance are within the statutory exception to
jury trial of "elsewhere excepted by law." "The common-law rule
of no right in either party to trial by jury of a purely equitable cause
in chancery, which was changed by the Act of 1846, is by this decision
again made the law in Tennessee."91 The supreme court denied
certiorari of this suit, although the court in the Hunt case did not hold
that there was no right to jury trial in a purely equitable cause but
rather that a certain quantum of evidence was necessary to establish
the right to a jury verdict.9 2 The reason for denial of certiorari is
difficult to determine, 93 but it should be noted that by such denial
the supreme court accepts only the results of the court of appeals
decision and not the language of that court.94
If the courts follow the language of the Doughty decision and
begin interpreting the right to jury trial in chancery according
to whether the action was triable by jury at common law, then
we have come indirectly to the same result as have the code states.95
The Tennessee Code in Sections 10574-80 by neither the historical
nor the common-law-sense interpretation manifests the intention that
such should be the case. Rather Code Section 10574 extends the right
to jury trial in chancery to all causes (common-law cases and equity
suits) which are not excepted, either from time immemorial as being
within the inherent power of the court98 or by legislative act.
)7
FRANK C. INGRAHAM
91. See 7 VAND. L. REV. 299 (1954).
92. See notes 88 and 89 supra.
93. There was admittedly a great deal of public resentment of the type of
"runners" that the St. Louis lawyer (defendant) was maintaining in Ten-
nessee. But the legal grounds for denying certiorari might have been: either
that there was not enough evidence to go to the jury; or that the defendants
were, as shown by their testimony, aiding the illegal practice of law by the
union. See Doughty v. Grills, 260 S.W.2d 379, 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S. 1952).
94. CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUrr § 452 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951).
95. The "code states" while abolishing the distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity and retaining but one form of action have continued to
determine the right to jury trial on the basis of whether that right existed
in the particular cause at the common law. The reason for this is that the
right to jury trial as it existed at the common law is preserved inviolate by
the Federal Constitution and most state constitutions. See CLARK, CASES ON
MODERN PLEADING C. IV, § 2, c. IX, §§ 1, 2.
96. See note 87 supra.
97. TENN. CODE AN. § 10574 (Williams 1934).
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